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In , Russia invaded Crimea, a region of land that was within
the geographic bounds of the Ukraine, claiming that it was legally
annexing the Peninsula from the Ukraine. The international
community viewed Russia’s annexation of Crimea in as a
violation of international norms. Since then, international
. See Austin Charron,Whose is Crimea? Contested Sovereignty and Regional
Identity, REGION , ( ) (describing the process of how Russia
managed to invade Crimea).
. See G.A. Res. , (Mar. , ) (finding that the
referendum has no validity and calling on all States, international organizations,
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organizations such as the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) have reported human
rights violations in Crimea. Many of these reports have revealed
abuses directed against the Crimean Tatars, an ethnic minority that
was victimized by the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
( U.S.S.R. ) in the s. From until alone, the Tatar
population in Crimea fell from to . Many international
organizations and States have expressed concern for the Crimean
Tatars, their safety, and their rights.
This Comment argues that Russia committed crimes against
humanity and thus violated customary international law because it
started a campaign of forcible transfer, unlawful imprisonment and
arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, torture, and persecution
directed at the Crimean Tatars. The international community considers
the prohibition of crimes against humanity is a peremptory norm in
and specialized agencies not to recognize the legality of the annexation); U.N.
GAOR, th Sess., th plen. mtg. at , U.N. Doc. A PV. (Mar. , )
(noting that Member States voted in favor of adopting draft resolution ).
. See e.g., Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol,
Ukraine , , , U.N. Doc. A HRC CRP. ( ) hereinafter HRC Report
(analyzing cases of human rights and humanitarian law violations in Crimea).
. Id. (highlighting the targeting of Tatars group in police raids and
prosecutions that resulted in proceedings that violate human rights standards in
Crimea).
. See Brian Glyn Williams, The Hidden Ethnic Cleansing of Muslims in the
Soviet Union: The Exile and Repatriation of the Crimean Tatars, J. CONTEMP.
HIST. , ( ) (noting the history of ethnic cleansing and migration of Tatars
and the lack of coverage of it in the West).
. Application of International Convention for Suppression of Terrorism and of
International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Ukr. v. Russ.), I.C.J. , Application Instituting Proceedings, (Jan. )
(citing to population census conducted by Ukraine in and one conducted by
Russia in ).
. See id. (submitting an application to begin litigation against Russia for
violations of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination on behalf of the Crimean Tatars); see also EUR. PARL. ASS. RES.
,Ukrainian Citizens Detained as Political Prisoners by the Russian Federation,
. , . (June , ), https pace.coe.int en files trace- (recalling
previous resolutions on deterioration of human rights and calling on the Russian
Federation to stop the prosecution on the Crimean’s and those that represent them).
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international law. Because Russia is bound by customary
international law, it violated its obligations not to commit crimes
against humanity.
Part II of this Comment provides information about the annexation
of Crimea, the Crimean Tatars, and their grievances since . Part
II also discusses the definition of crimes against humanity in
customary international law. Part III analyzes Russia’s actions
directed against the Crimean Tatars and applies them to the elements
of crimes against humanity. In Part IV, this Comment recommends
that the U.N. demand that Russia allow international and non-
governmental organizations back into Crimea so that they have the
capability to investigate crimes perpetrated against the Tatars. Part
IV also recommends that the Prosecutor for the International Criminal
Court concludes her preliminary investigation in Crimea in order to
issue arrest warrants and to interrogate individual perpetrators before
Ukraine revokes its limited urisdiction. Finally, Part IV
recommends that the international community pressure Russia to
investigate crimes committed by its de facto forces in order to avoid
impunity. Part V concludes that since Russia committed crimes
against humanity directed at the Crimean Tatars, it needs to provide
them with the correct remedies according to international norms.
II. BACKGROUND
A. TURMOIL INCRIMEA ANOVERVIEW OF THECRIMEAN
. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventy-Fourth Session, Supp.
No. , U.N. Doc. A , pmbl. ( ) hereinafter ILC Draft Articles on Crimes
Against Humanity (recalling prohibition of crimes against humanity is a
peremptory norm of general international law ( us cogens)).
. See G.A. Res. , annex, Responsibility of States for internationally
wrongful acts, art. (Dec. , ) ( Every internationally wrongful act of a State
entails the international responsibility of that State. ).
. See discussion infra Part II.A.
. See discussion infra Part II.B.
. See discussion infra Part III.
. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
. See discussion infra Part V.
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TATARS’ HISTORY AND OF RUSSIA’SACTIONS SINCE
1. The Crimean Tatars: A History of Displacement and
Marginalization
The Crimean Tatars are a distinct ethnic minority that originates
from the Crimean Peninsula. They constituted . of the Crimean
population before Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
Over the last few centuries, many governments have oppressed and
persecuted the Tatars. Suffering the worst under the U.S.S.R., Joseph
Stalin deported the Tatars to Central Asia after claiming that they were
traitors to the Soviet State. The Soviet’s treatment of the Tatars
throughout the remainder of the Cold War constituted serious human
rights violations.
In the s, the collapse of the Soviet Bloc coupled with a decree
in allowing the Tatars to return from Central Asia to Crimea
. See Charron, supra note , at (discussing the self-rule era of Crimea
and emergence of the Tatars ethnicity and identity that eventually became a part of
the national identity of the Crimea Peninsula).
. STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF UKRAINE, About the Number and
Population of Autonomous Republic of Crimea by data All-Ukrainian population
census, UKR. CENSUS (last visited Sept. , ),
http .ukrcensus.gov.ua eng results general nationality Crimea.
. See generallyWilliams, supra note , at (stating the history of colonial
rule of Crimea for over a century which led to almost half a million Tatars leaving
their homeland); accord Brian Glyn Williams,Hijra and the Forced Migration from
the Nineteenth-Century Russia to the Ottoman Empire: A Critical Analysis of the
Great Crimean Tatar Emigration of 1860-1861, CAHIERS DUMONDE RUSSE ,
, , ( ) (providing that Crimean Tatars were forcibly displaced
from their homes during the Russo-Turkish Wars and that as many as , of the
, Crimean Tatars fled the Crimean Peninsula after the CrimeanWar of
).
. See Williams, supra note , at (stating that Stalin had the Crimean
Tatars surrounded in their villages and deported from Crimea as they suffered cruel
treatment by armed soldiers on May , , a day which is still commemorated
by Crimean Tatars).
. See Charron, supra note , at (noting that as many as of deportees
perished en route and that the mass deportation was considered a genocide by the
Crimean Tatars, which attempted to remove their national identity); see also
Williams, supra note , at , (restating an interview with Crimean Tartars,
who describe the terrible living conditions in the settlements after their deportation
and being forced to work hours in fields and factories).
. See generally id. at (describing that a uarter of a million Crimean Tatars
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prompted the Tatars to rebuild their communities in the Crimean
Peninsula. These efforts included reuniting families and resettling
the southern coast of the Crimean Peninsula. Other efforts included
asserting political rights. For example, they established the Me lis
of the Crimean Tatar People, or Me lis, a representative and
executive body for the Tatars.
However, while resettling the Peninsula, other ethnic groups
opposed the return of the Tatars. There was significant pushback
from ethnic Slavs, who still viewed the Tatars as traitors who wanted
to capitalize on the government’s promises. Additionally, the
Ukrainian government provided little support to help Tatars resettle.
Unable to reclaim the land that belonged to them before the exile,
the Tatars began to s uat unoccupied land.
migrated back to the Crimean Peninsula between to , when President
Mikhail Gorbachev allowed their return).
. Id. at (discussing the Crimean Tatars’ efforts in rebuilding their society
after Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev permitted their integration with Soviet
society).
. Id. at , (expressing that initial task of the Crimean Tartars was uniting
with families and discovering the magnitude of the loss in their communities).
. See Charron, supra note , at (explaining that the Crimean Tatars
became politically active after their return to Crimea in the s and felt attached
to Ukrainian nationality).
. See General Information About the Mejlis, MEJLIS OF THE CRIMEAN TATAR
PEOPLE (last visited Sept. , ), http tmm.org en general-information-about-
me lis (providing a general information on the Me lis, an executive and
representative of the Crimean Tatar people made up of members including the
Chairman).
. See Charron, supra note , at (stating that ethnic Slavs marginalized and
discriminated against the Tatars once they began to resettle Crimea in ).
. See DANIEL ROTHBART KARINA V. KOROSTELINA, WHY THEY DIE
CIVILIANDEVASTATION INVIOLENTCONFLICT ( ) (explaining that Slavic and
Russian Crimeans still stigmatized the Tatars based on Stalin’s smear campaign after
World War II, accused them of never living in the Peninsula, and resented the Tatars
for claiming that Crimea was their homeland instead of the U.S.S.R.).
. Id. at (explaining that Ukraine did little to decrease tensions between
Tatars and ethnic Slavs and could not provide all returnees with affordable housing,
e ual educational opportunities, or ade uate medical services. ).
. See Charron, supra note , at (conveying that returnees had to build
homes on unoccupied after finding their land occupied by Slavs).
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2. Russia’s Actions in Crimea Since 2014
Tensions rose in Crimea after Russia annexed the Peninsula. In
late , protests erupted in Kyiv in response to Ukrainian President
Yanukovych re ecting an association agreement with the EU in favor
of closer economic ties with Russia. Without any evidence, Russia
framed the protests as a fascist movement hostile to Crimea’s ethnic
Russians. On February , , Russia sent armed men in
unmarked uniforms to seize the capital of Crimea. After holding a
hasty referendum, Crimean authorities declared independence and
sent a formal re uest to Russia for annexation on March , .
As such, Russia annexed it and instituted a de facto government to
oversee the Peninsula.
The international community declared that the annexation of
Crimea violated international law. Despite this, Russia began
. See AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THE DARK THE SILENCING OF DISSENT, ,
AI Index EUR ( ) hereinafter AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THE
DARK (reporting that, after the referendum and annexation, Russia began
suppressing opposing voices and began targeting the Crimean Tatars).
. See Charron, supra note , at (stating that the Euromaidan protests
resulted in deadly clashes with government forces and led to a shift to a more
sympathetic coalition).
. Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Rep. on the human rights
situation in Ukraine, (Apr. , ) hereinafter OHCHRReport ( It is widely
assessed that Russian-speakers have not been sub ect to threats in Crimea. ).
. See Charron, supra note , at (expressing Russian’s response of deeming
the protests hostile to Russian minorities in Ukraine, which became a strong and
common narrative for the ethnic Russians in the two regions within Ukraine, where
Russian were the regional ma ority).
. Id. at (noting that Russian authorities first claimed the armed men
were present in Simferopol to protect Russian speakers, however, it was later
revealed that they were military forces who then seized the Crimean Supreme
Council building to preside over the session and dissolve Crimea’s government).
. Id. at (stating that, although the referendum was held days after
President Putin sent in his troops and many observers doubt the veracity of the
referendum results, Crimean authorities declared the region’s independence on
March, and immediately issued a formal re uest to the Russian President for
acceptance into the Russian Federation. ).
. See id. at , (explaining that President Putin and representatives from
Crimea and Sevastopol signed an agreement that gave Russia the authority to
formally annex the territories).
. SeeG.A. Res. , supra note , (finding that the referendum held
had no validity and calling upon states, international organizations, and other
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implementing policies to solidify its control over the territory,
including efforts to create a more ethnically homogenous population
in Crimea.
In , Russia began violating Crimean citizens’ human rights.
At first, Russia restricted free access to information and began a
propaganda campaign in Crimea. Russian authorities, including the
Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), carried
out one-sided arrests for participants of anti-Russian protests.
agencies not to recognize the annexation or any alterations to the Crimea on the basis
of the referendum).
. See AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THEDARK, supra note , at (reporting on
the local authorities’ actions to control and restrict the freedom to assemble and
freedom of media to expand control and limit independent political and cultural
events).
. Application of International Convention for Suppression of Terrorism and of
International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Ukr. v. Russ.), I.C.J. , Application Instituting Proceedings, (Jan. )
( With effective control over Crimea established, the Russian Federation has
imposed a policy of Russian dominance, seeking to erase the distinct cultural
identities of the Peninsula’s ethnic Ukrainian and Tatar communities through a
pattern of discriminatory acts. ).
. See AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THEDARK, supra note , at (reporting on
the Russian Federation’s prosecution on trumped up charges, harassment, exile,
disappearance, and characterization of those who oppose Crimea’s annexation as
terrorists).
. SeeOHCHRReport, supra note , (reporting on the widespread misuse
of information and propaganda in Crimea); see alsoAMNESTY INT’L, ONEYEARON
VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF E PRESSION, ASSEMBLY AND
ASSOCIATION IN CRIMEA, , AI Index EUR (Mar. ) hereinafter
AMNESTY INT’L, ONE YEAR ON (explaining that the Russian authorities imposed
media restrictions on Crimean Tatar TV Channel ATR and other channels covering
events affecting the Tatar community. ).
. See HRC Report, supra note , , (reporting that the Federal Security
Service of the Russian Federation ( FSB ) and other police forces
disproportionately targeted Crimean Tatars through police raids, investigations, and
prosecutions); see also INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN CRIMEA AN ASSESSMENT OF TWO AND A HALF YEARS
OF RUSSIAN OCCUPATION , ( ) hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN
CRIMEA (finding that proxy militias began targeting Crimean Tatars and that
authorities in Crimea accepted and legalized their presence and conduct instead of
punishing them).
. Application Instituting Proceedings, I.C.J. at (claiming that the
Russian Federation targeted ethnic Ukrainians and Tatars for their protests during
the referendum and carried out one-sided arrests and prosecutions of those
participants. ).
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Reports arose of abduction, physical violence, and unlawful detention
of these peaceful anti-Russian protesters.
The de facto government then focused on targeting the Tatars’
political freedoms. In , Russian and Crimean courts suspended
the Me lis for being an extremist body because its leaders vocally
opposed the annexation. Different local and international actors
opposed the characterization of the Me lis. Some leaders of the
Me lis disappeared and were either found dead a few weeks later, or
were arrested and currently remain in pre-trial detention. Other
members and supporters of the Me lis were criminally prosecuted as
extremists. Additionally, Russian authorities prohibited celebration
of Sürgün, a culturally significant holiday for Crimean Tatar history.
Beyond this, the media restrictions disproportionately affected the
Crimean Tatars.
. See OHCHR Report, supra note , (recording the various reports of
civil society groups on the disappearance, arrests, harassment and violence against
peaceful demonstrators some of whom had signs of torture and ill-treatment).
. See generally AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THEDARK, supra note , at
(reporting human rights violations such as restrictions on the freedoms of speech and
assembly, banning the Me lis, unlawful arrests and detentions, and enforced
disappearances).
. Ivan Nechepurenko, Tatar Legislation is Banned in Crimea, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. , , at A (explaining that the Russian Justice Ministry and the Supreme
Court of Crimea both banned the Me lis as an extremist organization in and
that the Tatars were the only activists to vocally oppose the annexation in ).
. See, e.g., G.A. Res. , pmbl., (g) (Dec. , ) (calling on Russian
authorities t o revoke immediately the decision declaring the Me lis of the
Crimean Tatar People an extremist organization ).
. See, e.g., HRC Report, supra note , (citing at least five cases of
enforced disappearances of individuals that opposed the referendum with
involvement in Crimean Tartar institutions).
. See AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THEDARK, supra note , at (reporting on
the prosecution of local organizations and supporters of the Me lis following the
declaration of the Me lis as an extremist organization).
. See AMNESTY INT’L, ONE YEAR ON, supra note , at (reporting on the
de facto authorities’ ban of all public events in , on the th anniversary of an
important day for Crimean Tatars, May th, which is a date that commemorates
events that occurred in ). See generally Charron, supra note , at (defining
Sürgün as the holiday commemorating the day that Stalin ordered the deportation of
all Crimean Tatars to Central Asia).
. AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THEDARK, supra note , at (reporting on the
lack of access to media following the Peninsula’s annexation by Russia, and the risk
of prosecution for those that would broadcast any criticism of the Russian
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Next, Russian authorities perpetrated raids and invasions of the
Crimean Tatars’ homes beginning in . Reports document
uniformed men reclaiming property and land rights over the Tatars
because the land previously belonged to ethnic Russians. Russian
authorities also disproportionately targeted Crimean Tatars in police
raids and in criminal prosecutions. Police conducted raids as a means
to combat terrorist or extremist threats, where authorities
uestioned Tatars for hours while searching their homes.
Other reports document fundamental human rights violations.
These include allegations of enforced disappearances and arbitrary
detentions of Tatar leaders, their families, and their supporters. De
facto authorities also began to retroactively prosecute Tatars under
Russian law based on acts committed before the annexation.
authorities); see, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, ONE YEAR ON, supra note , at
(reporting the suspension of Crimean Tatar TV Channel ATR).
. See HRC Report, supra note , (reporting that of raids conducted
from to were of Crimean Tatar homes); CRIMEASOS, CRIMEASITUATION
REPORT ( ) (reporting that throughout police conducted searches
and arrests of Crimean Tatars’ and Jehovah Witnesses’ homes).
. Rita Izs k (Special Rapporteur on minority issues), Rep. on Mission to
Ukraine, , U.N. Doc. A HRC Add. (Jan. , ) (reporting the
statements of Tatar representatives that unidentified and uniformed men were
claiming Tatar properties and land).
. See HRC Report, supra note , (recording of documented property
searches and police raids from January , until June , that targeted
Crimean Tatars).
. Id. (reporting on the raids of private businesses, meeting places and
subse uent arrests of Crimean Tatars which were premised on the allegation that
they were members of a terrorist or extremist group without evidence to support such
allegations).
. U.S. COMM’N ON SEC. AND COOPERATION IN EUR., th CONG., HUMAN
RIGHTSVIOLATIONS INRUSSIAN-OCCUPIEDCRIMEA (Dec. , ) (briefing on
the human rights violation that occurred when Crimean Tatars were sub ected to
many hours of interrogations as their homes are searched).
. See, e.g., HRC Report, supra note , (reporting serious human rights
violations from September to June ); AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THE
DARK, supra note , at (reporting human rights violations against Crimean
Tatars from until ).
. See HRC Report, supra note , (concluding that nine Crimean
Tatars were victims of enforced disappearances from March , until June ,
); see, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THEDARK, supra note , at (stating
that Crimean Tatar activist Ervin Ibragimov went missing in May ).
. See HRC Report, supra note , (reporting on the prosecution of at least
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Finally, Russian authorities arrested Tatars it accused of participating
in Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamist organization that has been outlawed in
Russia since , but was not outlawed by Ukraine. Authorities
pressured the accused to waive their privately-held lawyers in
exchange for more lenient rulings. Authorities further harassed
lawyers representing Tatars by threatening to revoke their licenses.
Since , the Crimean Tatar population has dropped to .
Despite reports showing human rights violations, Russia argues that
its actions did not violate any international law norms. Rather, Russia
claimed that its actions were ustified because it was combatting
extremism in Crimea.
B. CRIMESAGAINSTHUMANITYDEFINED
1. The Prohibition of Crimes Against Humanity is a Peremptory
Norm in Customary International Law
Normally, States that have ratified the Rome Statute, a treaty
establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC), are bound by its
people, on acts committed before the occupation, based on Russian Federation
law).
. See INTERNATIONALCRIMES INCRIMEA, supra note , , ,
n. (identifying some detainees as alleged members of Hizb-ut-Takhrir, an
organization that has been banned by the Russian federation).
. SeeHRC Report, supra note , (reporting on instances when defendants
were warned against having private hired lawyers as it would damage their defense).
. Id. (reporting that a Russian investigator warned a Crimean Tatar’s lawyer
that he would lose his license’ and that it was a matter of time’ before he became
a defendant himself. ).
. Application of International Convention for Suppression of Terrorism and of
International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Ukr. v. Russ.), I.C.J. , Application Instituting Proceedings, (Jan. )
(citing to population census conducted by Ukraine in and one conducted by
Russia in showing a stark decrease of Crimean Tatar population).
. Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing
Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination (Ukr. v. Russ.), I.C.J. , Preliminary Ob ections Submitted by
the Russian Federation, , , n. (Sept. ), https www.ic -
ci .org files case-related - -WRI- - -EN.pdf (re uesting that
the International Court of Justice dismiss Ukraine’s claims of violations to the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination because
their actions were ustified in combatting extremism in Crimea).
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provisions and are sub ect to the ICC’s urisdiction when they commit
crimes against humanity. However, neither Ukraine nor Russia have
ratified the treaty, which would normally prevent Ukraine from
referring the situation in Crimea to the Court. Although Ukraine
accepted limited ICC urisdiction for events occurring in Ukraine and
Crimea from February , onwards, this does not guarantee
ICC urisdiction over the Peninsula. In fact, the number States who are
parties to the Rome Statute are limited and reducing. Refuting ICC
urisdiction while the Prosecutor is conducting her preliminary
investigation severely limits the scope any claims. Alternatively, the
U.N. Security Council can refer a situation to the Court. This route
. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. , , , July , ,
U.N.T.S. hereinafter Rome Statute .
. See id. art. ( ) (re uiring that a State referring a situation to the Prosecutor
must have ratified the Rome Statute, and that the crime must have been conducted
on the State’s territory or the accused is a national of that State); Russia Withdraws
from International Criminal Court Treaty, BBC (Nov. , ),
https www.bbc.com news world-europe- (stating that Russia is not
under the urisdiction of the International Criminal Court as it never ratified the
treaty); Ukraine, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https www.icc-
cpi.int ukraine (last visited Oct. , ) ( Ukraine is not a party to the Rome
Statute. ).
. See THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR,
REPORT ON PRELIMINARY E AMINATION ACTIVITIES ( ) (explaining that
Ukraine accepted limited ICC urisdiction for alleged crimes committed on its
territory from February , with no end date and that the Prosecutor extended
this urisdiction to include Crimea). See generally Rome Statute, supra note , art.
( ) (declaring that States that are not party to the Statute can accept limited
urisdiction).
. See, e.g., Franck Kuwonu, ICC: Beyond the Threats of Withdrawal, UNITED
NATIONS (last visited Sept. , ),
https www.un.org africarenewal magazine may- uly- icc-beyond-threats-
withdrawal (reporting that three countries withdrew from the ICC in ). See
generally The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONALCRIMINALCOURT
(last visited Sept. , ), https asp.icc-
cpi.int en menus asp states parties pages the states parties to th
e rome statute.aspx text countries are States Parties
,Western European and other States (listing the parties to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court).
. See e.g., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR, supra note , at (reporting that the Philippines’ withdrawal from
the Rome Statute limits the Prosecutor’s temporal urisdiction from the starting of
the alleged crimes to the date of withdrawal).
. Rome Statute, supra note , art. (b) (stating the Security Council’s right
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is also a nonstarter, since Russia would veto any Security Council
resolution that would hold them legally accountable.
Regardless, a State is still liable for violating peremptory norms of
customary international law. The international community
recognizes crimes against humanity as a peremptory norm. Since
World War II, customary international law has indoctrinated crimes
against humanity in different cases, treaties, and State laws.
2. Customary International Law’s Definition of Crimes Against
Humanity
Crimes against humanity are defined as the commission of
prohibited acts that are a part of a widespread or systematic attack and
are perpetrated against a civilian population pursuant to State policy
with knowledge of the widespread attack. The four elements of
to refer crimes to the prosecutor under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations).
. See, e.g., UN: Russia and China’s Abusive Use of Veto “Shameful”,
AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. , , PM),
https www.amnesty.org en latest news un-russia-and-chinas-abusive-
use-of-veto-shameful (stating that Russia vetoed Security Council resolutions for
its own self-interests).
. See G.A. Res. , annex, supra note , art. (declaring that a State is
responsible for violating peremptory norms).
. See ILC Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity, supra note , at
( Recalling also that the prohibition of crimes against humanity is a peremptory
norm of general international law ).
. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note , pmbl., art. (prohibiting crimes
against humanity); see also Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, art. , in Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S , annex (May , )
hereinafter ICTY Statute (giving the International Tribunal urisdiction to prosecute
instances of crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia and defining the
crime); S.C. Res. , art. (Nov. , ) (giving the International Tribunal
urisdiction to prosecute instances of crimes against humanity in the Rwanda and
defining the crime); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. , Jan. ,
, U.N.T.S. (granting urisdiction for Special Court to prosecute
perpetrators of crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone); Sean D. Murphy (Int’l
Law Comm’n Special Rapporteur for Crimes Against Humanity), First Report on
crimes against humanity, , U.N. Doc. A CN. (Feb. , ) hereinafter
ILC First Report (stating that as of , of U.N. Member States have national
laws relating to crimes against humanity).
. See Rome Statute, supra note , art. (defining and listing out prohibited
acts or crimes against humanity).
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crimes against humanity, their re uirements, and their interpretation
are explained in the following paragraphs.
a. Crimes Against Humanity Require the Perpetration of Prohibited
Acts
Crimes against humanity re uire the perpetration of prohibited and
enumerated acts. Thus, there is a nexus between the prohibited act
and the widespread or systematic attack.
The prohibited acts that are discussed in this Comment include the
deportation or forcible transfer of a population; imprisonment or other
severe deprivation of physical liberty; enforced disappearances;
torture; and persecution against an identifiable group or collectivity.
i. Deportation or Forcible Transfer of a Population is a Prohibited
Act
Deportation occurs when a perpetrator deported or forcibly
transferred, without grounds permitted under international law, one or
more persons to another State or location, by expulsion or other
coercive acts. There are two re uirements for forcible displacement
displacement and coercive acts.
First, perpetrators must have displaced individuals against their
will. This element does not re uire that victims move across borders
. See discussion supra Part II.A. .a d.
. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. (c), Aug. , ,
U.N.T.S. (prohibiting murder, extermination, enslavement, and deportation);
ICTY Statute, supra note , art. (e h) (adding imprisonment, torture, rape,
persecution on political, racial and religious grounds as prohibited acts), art. (e h)
(adding imprisonment, torture, rape, persecution on political, racial and religious
grounds as prohibited acts); Rome Statute, supra note , art. ( )( ) (including
apartheid as a prohibited act).
. Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC- - - , Judgment pursuant to Article
of the Statute, (Mar. , ) (stating the re uisite nexus between the
acts and the widespread or systemic attack).
. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES ( )
hereinafter ELEMENTS OF CRIMES (explaining the elements of deportation or
forcible transportation crimes elements).
. See Prosecutor v. Staki , Case No. IT- - -A, Judgment in the Appeals
Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. , )
(discussing the re uirement of involuntary displacement for an act to be deported).
. See generally ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note , at .
AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
permanently. Instead, victims can be displaced within a State or
territory. However, perpetrators must be aware that the victims were
lawfully present in the places that they inhabited.
Second, perpetrators must have displaced victims through coercive
acts. This element re uires force or threat of force. Coercive acts
include physical force, fear of violence, duress, detention,
psychological oppression, or abuse of power.
ii. Prohibited Acts Include Imprisonment or Other Severe
Deprivation of Physical Liberty
A second prohibited act under crimes against humanity is unlawful
imprisonment. Unlawful imprisonment consists of imprisonment or
deprivation of physical liberty in violation of international law. A
violation occurs if persons are detained without any reason to believe
that they pose a threat to the security of the Detaining Power.
. See Prosecutor v. Krno elac, IT- - -A, Judgment in the Appeals Chamber,
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. , ) (explaining that
there is no re uirement for the displacements to take place across national borders).
. See id. (holding that forced displacement re uires criminal responsibility of
the perpetrator , not a specific destination for the victim).
. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note , at (re uiring that t he perpetrator
was aware of the factual circumstances that established the lawfulness of such
presence. ).
. Staki , Case No. IT- - -A at ( The definition of deportation re uires
that . . . the relevant persons had no genuine choice in their displacement. ).
. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note , at n. (stating that a perpetrator
must have physically forced, threatened, or coerced the victim to leave).
. Prosecutor v. Krno elac, Case No. IT- - -T, Judgment, (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. , ) (finding that the essential element
of deportation was that the displacement was involuntary and that coercive acts were
not limited to physical force); Staki , Case No. IT- - -A at (reaffirming
coercive acts listed in the trial udgement of Krnojelac).
. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note , art. ( )(e).
. SeeMurphy, ILC First Report, supra note , (explaining the crime of
imprisonment as part of crimes against humanity, which occurs when there is a
depravation of physical liberty and violation of international law).
. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Times of War arts. , , Aug. , , U.N.T.S. hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention (declaring that detainment is only lawful if it is absolutely
necessary to protect a State’s security and if the State provides the detainee with
procedural safeguards); Prosecutor v. Kordi , Case No. IT- - -A, Judgment in
the Appeals Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec.
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Unlawful imprisonment also occurs when perpetrators deprive victims
of procedural safeguards.
Alternatively, the unlawful deprivation of liberty includes arbitrary
detention. Arbitrary detention is the deprivation of liberty of the
individual without due process of law. Arbitrary detention can
occur when perpetrators do not inform a victim about his charges at
the time of his arrest; do not provide the victim with a trial within a
reasonable amount of time; or do not provide the victim a trial in front
of a neutral udge.
iii. Enforced Disappearances as Prohibited Acts
Customary international law also prohibits enforced
disappearances. This crime is defined as the arrest, detention, or
abduction of persons with State support or authorization, and a
refusal to either give information on their whereabouts or to
acknowledge their disappearance. There are two inseparable
elements the deprivation of a person’s freedom and the suppression
of information of his whereabouts. Because the State must provide
, ) (stating that the standards of the Fourth Geneva Convention, except for
the existence of an international armed conflict, applies to unlawful imprisonment
in crimes against humanity).
. Id. (noting that failure to comply with procedural safeguards re uired by
Article of the Geneva Convention regarding detained individuals will make the
imprisonment unlawful even if it was lawful initially).
. Id. (finding that unlawful imprisonment under crimes against humanity
includes arbitrary detention); see also Murphy, ILC First Report, supra note ,
(recognizing that unlawful imprisonment includes arbitrary detention under
customary international law).
. Kordi , IT- - -A at (agreeing with the trial court, on the findings
regarding arbitrary imprisonment).
. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. , Dec. , ,
U.N.T.S. hereinafter ICCPR .
. See, e.g., Murphy, ILC First Report, supra note , (stating that
removal of individuals without purposes permitted by international law is considered
a forcible transfer or deportation).
. Rome Statute, supra note , art. ( )(i) (defining the term enforced
disappearance of persons’); International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance art. , Dec. , , U.N.T.S.
(describing the crime of enforced disappearance of persons’).
. Situation in the Republic of Burundi, ICC- - - -US-Exp, Public
Redacted Version of Decision Pursuant to Article of the Rome Statute on the
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi ,
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information about the victim’s whereabouts, it must also conduct an
investigation into the disappearance. This crime continues so long as
the victim remains missing and or no information about his
whereabouts surfaces.
iv. Torture May Amount to a Crime Against Humanity
Torture is also a prohibited act under the definition of crimes against
humanity. Throughout multiple treaties, torture is defined as the
intentional infliction of suffering on a person in custody. Suffering
can include physical or mental pain. However, the torturer must
have wanted a certain result, which can include obtaining
information or a confession; punishing, intimidating or coercing the
victim or a third person; or discriminating, on any ground, against the
victim.
(Oct. , ) hereinafter Situation in Burundi (highlighting the
inseparability of the two elements).
. Id. (stating the obligation of the state authorities to acknowledge, give
information, or investigate an individual’s whereabouts).
. Id. (stressing the continuity of the crime so long as the person is
missing and information is concealed).
. Rome Statute, supra note , art. ( )(f) (listing torture as one of the acts
considered to amount to crimes against humanity); Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment pmbl., art. , Dec. ,
, U.N.T.S. hereinafter CAT (discussing the meaning of the crime
torture and the convention’s agreement).
. Rome Statute, supra note , art. ( )(e) (defining the crime of torture); see
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW n. ( d ed. ) (explaining that
the Rome Statute’s definition of torture reflects international caselaw, the
Convention Against Torture, and other legal instruments).
. See ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note , at (discussing the elements of
the crime of torture); Prosecutor v. Krno elac, Case No. IT- - -T, Judgment,
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. , ) (using the following
factors to analyze suffering the context of the infliction of pain , premeditation,
physical condition of the victim , the manner and method used , and victim’s
position of inferiority ).
. CAT, supra note , art. (stating the elements of the crime of torture as
including intent of the person inflicting the pain or suffering); see also Krnojelac,
IT- - -T at (stating that the act of torture re uires intent or purpose).
. Krnojelac, IT- - -T at (listing different prohibited purposes that
could be the motivations of acts of torture).
REPEATINGHISTORY
v. Persecution as a Prohibited Act
Finally, persecution is a prohibited act as understood within crimes
against humanity definition. This crime has two distinct elements a
persecutory act or omission that deprives victims of fundamental
human rights, and the intent to target individuals because of their
membership in the group or collectivity.
First, there must be a persecutory act or omission. The act or
omission must either connected to other prohibited acts falling within
crimes against humanity, war crimes, or genocide. The act must be
of e ual gravity to other crimes against humanity. Persecution under
customary international law can take different forms, including
serious bodily and mental harm, infringements of freedom, and attacks
against property. For example, the courts in both Kordi and Blaški
considered willful killing, plundering and pillaging, forcible
displacement, inhumane treatment of civilians, and attacks on towns
and cities as acts that can amount to persecution. However, these
acts still must deny or infringe upon fundamental rights under
. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note , art. ( )(h) (listing persecution as one
of the recognized crimes against humanity).
. See Murphy, ILC First Report, supra note , (citing to multiple
sources of international law on the elements and crime of persecution); Prosecutor
v. Bla ki , Case No. IT- - -A, Judgment in the Appeals Chamber, (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July , ) (listing the two elements of
the crime of persecution).
. Blaški , IT- - -A at (considering the act or omission which must be
of e ual weight to the other crimes against humanity).
. Rome Statute, supra note , art. ( )(h) (defining the crime of persecution);
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note , at (stating the elements of the crime of
persecution).
. Prosecutor v. Kordi , Case No. IT- - -A, Judgment in the Appeals
Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. , ) (stating
that acts alone or together with other acts must be of e ual weight to other crimes
against humanity); Blaški , IT- - -A at (noting that not all acts perpetrated
with discriminatory intent amount to persecutions under crimes against humanity).
. Blaški , IT- - -A at (affirming the Trial Chamber’s list of different
forms of persecution based on urisprudence in the Nuremberg Tribunal and the
ICTY).
. Id. (considering whether the underlying acts that are the basis for
the persecution crime, constituted a crime under international law); Kordi , IT- -
-A at (analyzing the various acts underlying the persecution crime).
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customary international law.
Second, perpetrators must target individuals based on their
identification with a group. A perpetrator must have discriminated
based on gender, political, cultural, national, religious, ethnic or racial
grounds. Other prohibited acts that are a part of the attack could
constitute persecution if the perpetrators had discriminatory intent.
b. For Crimes Against Humanity, There Must be an Attack “Against
a Civilian Population”
Under the definition of crimes against humanity, there must have
been an attack against a civilian population. This re uirement can
be separated into three distinct elements ) an attack ) that is directed
against a civilian population and ) is pursuant to State policy.
i. There Must be an “Attack” for There to be Crimes Against
Humanity
To be classified as a crime against humanity, customary
international law re uires that an attack occurred. The occurrence of
an armed conflict involving civilians is dispositive evidence for an
attack . However, the attack does not need to be military in
. Kordi , IT- - -A at (stating that the acts committed must be in
violation of a right established in international customary law to constitute the crime
of persecution).
. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note , at .
. Rome Statute, supra note , art. ( )(h); see also Blaški , IT- - -A,
(explaining that victimized persons were selected on grounds linked to their
belonging to a particular community).
. Blaški , IT- - -A at .
. See ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note , at (stating that the attack must
be against a civilian population).
. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC- , Decision Pursuant to Article
of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in
the Republic of Kenya, (Mar. , ) hereinafter Situation in Kenya .
. See ELEMENTS OFCRIMES, supra note , at (explaining that crimes against
humanity re uire conduct which is impermissible under generally applicable
international law).
. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT- - -T, Judgment in the Trial
Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. , )
(discussing existence of an armed conflict); Prosecutor v. Tadi , Case No. IT- - -
T, Opinion and Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May
, ) (discussing the existence of armed conflicts); Fourth Geneva Convention,
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nature because an attack on a civilian population may precede,
outlast, or continue during an armed conflict. Courts such as the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s Appeals
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kunarac recognized that an attack against a
civilian population encompasses any mistreatment of the civilian
population.
ii. The Attack Must be “Directed Against a Civilian Population”
The attack must be directed against a civilian population. Under
customary international law, a civilian population typically includes
all persons who are civilians and or are not members of armed
forces. Even when certain individuals are actively participating in
hostilities, there still may be a civilian population. A civilian
population can consist of a national, ethnic, or otherwise
homogeneous group.
Additionally, the directed against language indicates that the
civilian population must be the primary ob ect of the attack. Even
though the perpetrators cannot target randomly selected
supra note , art. ( The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation
meets with no armed resistance. ).
. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC- - , Judgment pursuant to
article of the Statute, (Mar. , ).
. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT- - IT- - -A, Judgment in the
Appeals Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June , ).
. Id.
. Tadi , IT- - -T at (reviewing sources of customary international
law for the legal basis of the element).
. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August , and
relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) art.
( ) ( ), June , , U.N.T.S. ; Tadi , IT- - -T at (discussing the
meaning of civilian); Kunarac, IT- - IT- - -A at (noting that, in
peace-time, civilians includes everyone except for law enforcement officers).
. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR- - -T, Judgment in Chambre I,
(Sept. , ); see also Tadi , IT- - -T at (holding that the presence of
persons who actively participated in resistance movements does not prevent a
population from being civilian).
. Situation in Kenya, ICC- , .
. Kunarac, IT- - IT- - -A at ; Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-
- - , Judgment pursuant to Article of the Statute, (Mar. ,
).
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individuals, the attack does not have to be directed at every single
civilian. Instead, courts determine whether an attack is targeting the
civilian population based on the collective nature of the crimes.
Courts examine the means and methods of the attack, the status of the
victims, their number, the discriminatory nature of the attack, the
nature of the crimes committed in its course, and the resistance to the
assailants at the time. . . . Finally, an attack occurs even if a State
targeted its own civilian population instead of the opponent’s civilian
population.
iii. The Attack Must be Pursuant to “State Policy”
The third element re uires that attack must be pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such an
attack. The existence of a policy shows that a State or organization
meant to directly attack a civilian population. A policy re uires that
the State or organization actively promote or encourage such an
attack against a civilian population’ and may include a deliberate
failure to take action. In Prosecutor v. Katanga, the policy intended
to pit ethnic groups against one another so that the State could gain
. Situation in Kenya, ICC- , .
. See Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC- - , Judgment pursuant
to article of the Statute, (Mar. , ) (explaining that it is not necessary
for Prosecution to prove that the entire geographic area was targeted at the time of
the attack).
. See id. (stating that an attack does not need to target the entire population
and occurs if civilians were targeted during the attack in sufficient number or in
such a manner that the attack was effectively directed against the civilian
population ).
. Kunarac, IT- - IT- - -A at .
. SeeMurphy, ILC First Report, supra note , (stating an attack can be
committed against any civilian population).
. Rome Statute, supra note , art. ( )(a); see also Prosecutor v. Tadi , Case
No. IT- - -T, Opinion and Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia May , )(recognizing that crimes against humanity arose
historically from some form of policy to deliberately target a civilian
population ).
. Katanga, ICC- - at . See generally Situation in Kenya, ICC-
, (explaining that a regional government, local government, or
organization can also create policy so long as they had the capacity to commit the
attack).
. Katanga, ICC- - at .
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control over a territory.
A State policy does not have to be formal and can be inferred.
Courts and tribunals have used different factors when determining
whether such a policy exists. For example, the ICC examines the
scale of the attack, geo-political background of the attack, and
mobilization of armed forces. Additionally, the court in Kupreški
inferred a State policy when police officers were committing the
prohibited acts.
A policy can include the failure of a State to act. The failure to act
must be consciously aimed at encouraging such attack. For
example, a State fails to act if it does not investigate the perpetration
of any prohibited acts.
c. Perpetrators of Crimes Against Humanity Must Have
“Knowledge of the Attack”
An individual must have had knowledge of the attack when
perpetrating prohibited acts. This Comment does not explore this
element because it focuses on a State’s responsibility instead of an
individual’s.
d. The Attack Must be “Widespread or Systematic” to Amount to
. Id. .
. Id. (stating that because it is rare for a State or an organization to
create a pre-established design or plan to attack a civilian population, this policy
can be inferred).
. See Prosecutor v. Bla ki , Case No. IT- - -T, Judgment, (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. , ) (outlining historical and
political background of the attack, the creation of political structures, a general
political or media program, discriminatory measures, the scale of violence, etc. are
elements that show policy).
. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, UNDENIABLE ATROCITIES
CONFRONTING CRIMESAGAINSTHUMANITY INME ICO ( ).
. Prosecutor v. Kupre ki , Case No. IT- - -T, Judgement, , (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. , ).
. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note , at n. ; Kupreški , IT- - -T at
.
. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note , at .
. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note , at .
. SeeOPENSOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note , at (explaining that
the perpetrators’ intent is not necessary for prosecutors to show that a State
committed crimes against humanity).
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Crimes Against Humanity
There must be a widespread or systematic attack for there to be
crimes against humanity. The attack, not the individual act, has to
be widespread or systematic in order to exclude isolated or random
acts of violence. Although widespread and systematic are
dis unctive elements, they share many of the same re uirements and
can exist simultaneously.
A widespread attack is defined as the large-scale nature of the
attack and number of victims. An attack could be widespread
depending on the effects of multiple inhumane acts or a single
inhumane act of great magnitude. Courts use case-by-case analyses
because there is no ualitative or uantitative measure for a
widespread attack.
Courts use different factors to determine whether an attack is
widespread. For example, the Trial Chamber in Blaški determined
that there was a widespread attack based on the number of victims
within the area. Other courts, such as the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber
in Prosecutor v. Bemba, hold that multiple atrocities are widespread
when perpetrated across a large geographical area or an attack in a
small geographical area directed against a large number of
civilians.
Alternatively, an attack can be systematic based on the
. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note , at .
. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT- - IT- - -A, Judgment in the
Appeals Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June , ).
. Prosecutor v. Tadi , Case No. IT- - -T, Opinion and Judgment, (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May , ).
. Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC- - - , Judgment pursuant to Article
of the Statute, (Mar. , )
. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note , at .
. Kunarac, IT- - IT- - -A at .
. ILC First Report, supra note , .
. Bemba, ICC- - at .
. Prosecutor v. Bla ki , Case No. IT- - -T, Judgment, (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. , ); Prosecutor v. Bla ki , Case No. IT-
- -A, Judgment in the Appeals Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July , ) (affirming the Trial Chamber’s analysis of a widespread
or systematic attack).
. Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC- - , Decision Pursuant to
Article ( )(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, (June , ).
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organized nature of the acts of violence and improbability of their
random occurrence. As demonstrated in Prosecutor v. Akayesu and
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, courts can examine whether the attack was
thoroughly organized and followed a regular pattern on the basis of
a common policy involving substantial public or private resources.
III. ANALYSIS
Russia committed crimes against humanity when it mistreated the
Tatar civilian population by allowing de facto authorities to perpetrate
prohibited acts in furtherance of State policy. The following section
analyzes crimes against humanity, further dissects their elements, and
applies the appropriate tests to the facts. It then debunks Russia’s
argument that its actions were legal in confronting violent extremism
in Crimea.
A. RUSSIACOMMITTED CRIMESAGAINSTHUMANITY
Russia is liable if it committed prohibited acts that were a part of a
widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population in
pursuance of a policy. The foregoing analysis shows how Russia
fulfilled every element of the crime.
1. Russia Committed Crimes Against Humanity by Perpetrating
Multiple Prohibited Acts
Based on reports and allegations, Russia perpetrated the following
prohibited acts deportation or forcible transfer; unlawful
imprisonment; enforced disappearances; torture; and persecution
against an identifiable group. The following paragraphs discusses
each prohibited act.
a. Russia Committed Prohibited Acts under Crimes Against
. ILC First Report, supra note , ( uoting Prosecutor v. Mrk i ,
Judgment in the Trial Chamber, Case No. IT- - , (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Sept. , )).
. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR- - -T, Judgment in Chambre I,
(Sept. , ); Kunarac, IT- - IT- - -A at .
. See Rome Statute, supra note , art. ( ) (defining what constitutes a crime
against humanity).
. HRC Report, supra note , (listing human rights violations).
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Humanity when It Forcibly Transferred the Crimean Tatar
Population
Beginning in , Russian authorities have forcibly displaced
Crimean Tatars, which constitutes a prohibited act under crimes
against humanity. Primarily, figures showing that the Tatar
population dropped from in to in demonstrate
displacement across borders. Other figures from show that
approximately , to , Crimean Tatars fled the territory since
.
The Tatars were forcibly displaced due to coercive acts. Although
these acts did not include physically moving Tatars out of Crimea,
there is enough evidence to suggest that Russian authorities threatened
to use force. Specifically, the Tatars most likely fled Crimea due to
fear of violence and duress. For example, Russian courts sent
expulsion orders to various members of the Tatar community, which
deprived victims of a choice to stay. Other Tatars fled because they
. See Application of International Convention for Suppression of Terrorism
and of International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Ukr. v. Russ.), I.C.J. , Application Instituting Proceedings,
(Jan. ) (observing a ten-percent drop in the Tatar population between and
); Prosecutor v. Staki , Case No. IT- - -T, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July , ) (noting the reduction of certain populations).
. Application Instituting Proceedings, I.C.J. at .
. INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN CRIMEA, supra note , . See generally 6
years of Occupation: Demographic Changes and Violations of Freedom of Religion
and Self-Determination, CRIMEA SOS (Mar. , , AM),
https krymsos.com en news e a beb e (reporting that , people have
fled from Crimea to Ukraine since ).
. See generally Prosecutor v. Krno elac, Case No. IT- - -T, Judgment,
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. , ) (defining
deportation as the forced displacement of persons by expulsion or coercive acts).
. Id. (explaining that fear of violence is a coercive act).
. See INTERNATIONALCRIMES INCRIMEA, supra note , (observing that
the ma ority of Tatars who left did so because of coercive acts, and some were
physically expelled); Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC- - ,
Judgment, (July , ) (stating that the Chamber considers the first element
of the crime against humanity of deportation or forcible transfer of population is
fulfilled also in relation to the individuals who fled as soon as they noticed the first
signs of fighting).
. INTERNATIONALCRIMES INCRIMEA, supra note , n. (finding that
Chubarov, chairman of the Me lis, was banished through an order that was made in
absentia and outside of the Crimean Peninsula).
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have experienced violence or fear of violence and harassment by the
authorities and paramilitary groups. Police raids, disappearances,
detentions, and uniformed men asserting property rights probably
instilled this fear. Like in Staki , where Muslims fled from Pri edor
because of the pervasive coercive atmosphere deprived them of any
genuine choice to leave, the Tatars felt pressured to leave Crimea
because of the geopolitical climate.
b. Russia Committed Prohibited Acts by Unlawfully Imprisoning
and Severely Depriving Crimean Tatars of Their Physical Liberty
Abuses perpetrated against the Crimean Tatars by Russian
authorities include unlawful imprisonment and arbitrary detention.
First, Russian authorities unlawfully arrested Tatar leaders and
other activists because there was no real evidence that they posed a
threat to Russia’s control over Crimea. Because there was no
evidence that arrested Tatars actually violated any law, Russia
deprived them of their rights guaranteed by the Geneva Conventions
and customary international law. The Russians unlawfully detained
three different Tatar groups those that supported the Me lis, those that
. Id. .
. See id. (claiming that the Russian authorities’ actions created a
coercive atmosphere ).
. See Prosecutor v. Staki , Case No. IT- - -T, , (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July , ) (finding that Muslims fled Pri edor
because of a coercive atmosphere , which was created through a propaganda
campaign, rising tensions between Serbs and Muslims, and threats to themselves or
to their property).
. INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN CRIMEA, supra note , (stating that
Crimean Tatars fled because of the threat of loss of liberty, violence and threat of
violence, harassment, and the general climate of fear and prosecution . . . ).
. Compare Prosecutor v. Kordi , Case No. IT- - -A, Judgment in the
Appeals Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. , )
(explaining when imprisonment of civilians is unlawful); with HRC Report, supra
note , (discussing arbitrary arrests and detentions of the Tatars).
. See HRC Report, supra note , (finding that Russia arrested Crimean
Tatars with little evidence that they posed any threat). See generally Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note , art. (allowing States to forcibly displace persons when
it is absolutely necessary for a State’s security).
. See HRC Report, supra note , (stating ustifications underpinning the
arrests of alleged terrorists provided little evidence); Kordi , IT- - -A at
(finding that there was no foundation to arrest the detainees for security reasons).
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Russia accused of participating in Hizb ut-Tahrir, and those that
participated in protests before Russia’s annexation in .
Russia primarily targeted the Me lis leaders and their supporters in
its campaign of unlawful arrests. Russia, however, argues that these
individuals’ opposition to Russia’s occupation and annexation of
Crimea violated Russia’s laws and constitutional order.
Specifically, the Russian Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of
Crimea held that international terrorist organizations supported the
Me lis and that the Me lis aim ed to destroy Russia’s territorial
integrity. Despite these accusations, the international community
still regards the Me lis as a democratic and executive institution.
Multiple States and international organizations, such as the US the
European Parliament, have since condemned the suspension of the
Me lis.
De facto Russian authorities also arrested other Crimean Tatars for
. INTERNATIONALCRIMES INCRIMEA, supra note , , n. .
. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, ONEYEARON, supra note , at (reporting that
de facto authorities arrested Me lis Deputy Leader Akhtem Chiygoz); CRIMEA SOS,
SITUATION REPORT , supra note (reporting that on January , the
Supreme Court of Crimea held that Me lis member Eskender Bariev should be
brought in as a defendant after upholding a lower court’s decision to detain him, and
that both decisions were made in absentia).
. See Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of
Financing Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination (Ukr. v. Russ.), I.C.J. , Preliminary Ob ections
Submitted by the Russian Federation, , n. (Sept. ) (conveying the
Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea’s decision that the extremist acts of
the Tatar people violated the integrity of the Russian Federation).
. Nechepurenko, supra note .
. See Eur. Parl. Ass., Legal remedies for human rights violations on the
Ukrainian territories outside the control of the Ukrainian authorities, Res. No. ,
( ) (discussing how the Tatars live in a climate of severe intimidation created
by human rights violations and how they have lost their democratic representation
as a result of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation’s decision banning the
Me lis).
. See Press Statement, Mark C. Toner, Deputy Department Spokesperson,
U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Pub. Aff., Russian Supreme Court’s Illegitimate
Decision to Ban the Me lis of the Crimean Tatar People (Sept. , ),
https - .state.gov r pa prs ps .htm (stating that the United
states does not recognize the legitimacy of the ruling banning the Me lis); EUR.
PARL. ASS., Humanitarian Consequences of the War in Ukraine, Doc. No. ,
. (Jan. , ) (calling for Russia to lift the ban on the Me lis).
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allegedly participating in Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamist organization.
Although Russia banned Hizb ut-Tahrir in , almost all other
European countries have not. However, the accused were simply
meeting in mos ues, were asserting their right to assemble, and were
not connected to Hizb ut-Tahrir.
Finally, Russian authorities arrested and detained activists who
protested Russian occupation before the annexation, which
violates international custom of non-retroactivity.
Additionally, Russia committed arbitrary detention by seriously
depriving Crimean Tatars of their liberty without due process of the
law. First, Russia deprived the Tatars of their right to humane
treatment while in detention. Reports accuse Russian authorities of
. HRC Report, supra note , .
. Crimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars Intensifies, HUMANRIGHTSWATCH
(Nov. , ), https www.hrw.org news crimea-persecution-
crimean-tatars-intensifies .
. See HRC Report, supra note , (stating that three persons who were
arrested mentioned three meetings at a mos ue, during which the defendants
discussed world-wide political developments . . . ); Crimea: Persecution of
Crimean Tatars Intensifies, supra note (explaining that persons were arrested
on charges of participating in Hizb ut-Tharir solely for acts often in private
of expression, assembly, opinion, or religious and political belief ); CRIMEA SOS,
SITUATION REPORT , supra note (finding that in March , authorities
arrested twenty Crimean Tatar ournalists and activists for alleged involvement
with Hizb ut-Tahrir).
. INTERNATIONALCRIMES INCRIMEA, supra note , .
. See generally HRC Report, supra note , (explaining that at least ten
people were tried under Russian federal law for crimes committed before Russian
annexation); EUR. CT. H.R., Guide on Article 7 of the European Convention on
Human Rights – No punishment without law: the principle that only the law can
define a crime and prescribe a penalty, (Apr. , ) (stating t he principle
of non-retroactivity is infringed in cases of retroactive application of legislative
provisions to offenses committed before those provisions came into force. )
hereinafter ECHR, Guide on Article 7 .
. See generally Prosecutor v. Kordi , Case No. IT- - -A, Judgment in the
Appeals Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. , )
(noting that arbitrary detention occurs when victims are deprived of procedural
safeguards and are sub ect to inhumane treatment).
. See HRC Report, supra note , , (reporting that detainees were
sub ect to torture); Kordi , IT- - -A at , , , (explaining the
trial chambers finding that detainees were sub ected to poor conditions and
mistreatment); Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, Preliminary Ob ections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. , (Sept.
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holding unduly long pre-trial detentions of Crimean Tatars. Russian
authorities also used coercion and torture tactics in order to extract
confessions. Authorities sent several arrested Tatars to mental
institutions without any evidence that they re uired treatment.
Second, Russia arbitrarily detained Crimean Tatars when it denied
them e ual access to the law. Russia has either threatened the
Tatars’ lawyers or has denied the lawyers access to information
about their clients’ whereabouts or well-being. Additionally,
Russians violated the Tatars’ due process rights through police raids
that occurred before arrest as a means to investigate suspects. These
police raids of the Tatars’ homes, private businesses, and meeting
places often lead to harassment of occupants and or searches that went
beyond the scope of the warrant.
c. Russia Committed Prohibited Acts by Forcibly Making Crimean
, ) (finding that Chile committed arbitrary detention as a part of crimes
against humanity when police officers shot a man in detention who later died of his
wounds).
. See AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THEDARK, supra note , at (reporting
that Crimean Me lis leader Akhtem Chiygoz was held in pre-trial detention for more
than months).
. SeeHRCReport, supra note , (reporting that a udge approved a guilty
plea agreement despite evidence that the accused had been unlawfully detained
several days prior to the documented date of arrest. During the period preceding
official arrest, he was tortured and sub ected to mock execution. ).
. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THE DARK, supra note , at
(describing the Russian authorities forcing Ilmi Umerov to undergo psychiatric
evaluations and committing him); CRIMEA SOS, SITUATION REPORT , supra
note (explaining the existence of a practice of putting defendants accused of
participating in Hizb ut-Tahrir in psychiatric hospitals).
. See generally ICCPR, supra note , art. ( ) (stating that all persons shall
be treated e ually before the courts and tribunals. ).
. See HRC Report, supra note , (explaining that Tatar defendants facing
extremism charges were pressured into waiving their privately-hired lawyers in
exchange for leniency).
. Id. .
. See id. (explicating that some searches were house observations which
re uired no udicial supervision when the owner gives consent).
. Id. ( The raids often involved excessive use of force and an extent of
searches not warranted by circumstances, going beyond the lawful ob ective of
preventing crime and protecting the rights and freedoms of others. ).
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Tatars Disappear
Because several reports show that the Crimean Tatars forcibly
disappeared at the hands of Russian authorities, Russia satisfied the
first element of enforced disappearances. Persons who have
disappeared include members of the Me lis, their supporters, and their
family members. Moreover, a number of disappeared persons either
remain missing or their bodies have been found.
Russia satisfied the second element of enforced disappearances
because it has suppressed the information of the victims’
whereabouts. Reports arising in Crimea reveal that authorities have
not disclosed any information about those that remain missing.
The same reports show that Russia was involved with the enforced
disappearances, thus satisfying the re uisite nexus between the
disappearances and the State. Russia approved of these acts when it
allowed de facto authorities to perpetrate these disappearances.
. See id. (stating that from March , to June , , at least forty-
two persons were victims of forced disappearances); INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN
CRIMEA, supra note , at (documenting seven enforced disappearances of
Crimean Tatars). See generally Situation in Burundi, ICC- - - -US-Exp,
(noting that the crime of enforced disappearance re uires deprivation of liberty, and
the ensuing denial or suppression of information. ).
. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN CRIMEA, supra note , at (reporting
that Islyam D epparov, the son of a Me lis leader; D evdet Islyamov, the nephew of
a Me lis leader; and Eldar Selyamiev, a supporter of the Me lis disappeared);
Situation in Burundi, ICC- - - -US-Exp, , (holding that political
opponents disappearing amounted to the deprivation of freedom).
. See Crimea: Enforced Disappearances, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. ,
), https www.hrw.org news crimea-enforced-disappearances
(reporting that on October , , the body of a missing Crimean Tatar man who
had no political ties was found hanged).
. See Situation in Burundi, ICC- - - -US-Exp, (expressing that the
suppression of information includes the refusal to acknowledge or give information
encompasses outright denial or giving false information about the whereabouts of
the victim ).
. See HRC Report, supra note , (stating i n relation to the last ten
victims, the authorities have either refused to register a case or suspended previously
initiated investigations. This lack of progress in the investigations raises uestions
about their effectiveness ).
. Situation in Burundi, ICC- - - -US-Exp, (holding that state
involvement through authorization, support, or ac uiescence perpetrates the crime).
. See INTERNATIONALCRIMES INCRIMEA, supra note , (stating there
is evidence supporting the allegation that the initial abductions took place by or on
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Russia also was complicit in the enforced disappearances when it
failed to investigate the victims’ whereabouts. Victims remain listed
as missing and the perpetrators have not been brought to ustice.
d. Russian Authorities Tortured Crimean Tatars While They Were
Imprisoned, Which Amounted to Acts Prohibited Under Crimes
Against Humanity
Reports of Russian authorities torturing Tatars have arisen since the
annexation. The reports document an intentional infliction of
suffering on detained Tatars, which fulfills the first element of
torture. Methods used include physical violence, threats of sexual
violence, mock executions, and electro-shock therapy. These acts
most certainly brought physical and mental suffering upon the
victims.
Allegations also accuse Russians of torturing for a prohibited
behalf of the occupying authorities ).
. Compare HRC Report, supra note , (documenting that the Crimean
self-defense group, FSB, and Armed Forces of the Russian Federation perpetrated
the disappearances of the Crimean Tatars), with Situation in Burundi, ICC- - - -
US-Exp, (holding that when State agents, such as the police, the intelligence
service and the army perpetrate enforced disappearances, then so does the State).
. See HRC Report, supra note , (stating that seven persons remain
missing and for at least ten victims the authorities have either refused to register a
case or suspended previously initiated investigations. ); Situation in Burundi, ICC-
- - -US-Exp, (holding that the State is re uired to investigate enforced
disappearances).
. See generally Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT- - IT- - -A,
Judgment in the Appeals Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia June , ).
(defining the crime of torture).
. See HRC Report, supra note , (describing physical mistreatments
the Tatars were sub ected to); Prosecutor v. Krno elac, Case No. IT- - -T,
Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. , )
(holding that beating, depriving victims of food, and sub ecting victims to solitary
confinement inflicted suffering onto victims); Kunarac, IT- - IT- - -A
at (finding that rape gives rise to severe pain or suffering whether it be mental
or physical, which ustifies its characterization as an act of torture).
. HRC Report, supra note , , ; INTERNATIONALCRIMES INCRIMEA,
supra note , at (documenting instances of torture on detainees).
. Cf. Krnojelac, Case No. IT- - -T at (holding that mistreatment
that were aimed at obtaining information were torture);Kunarac, IT- - IT- -
-A at (finding rape is physical violence).
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purpose, which fulfills the second element of torture. Specifically,
reports allege that authorities used ill-treatment and methods of torture
to illicit involuntary confessions. These allegations are similar to the
facts in Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, where the accused beat detainees to
gain information on an escaped prisoner. Reports also allege that
Russian authorities used torture as a punishment, deterrence, or
investigative techni ue.
e. Russian Authorities have Persecuted Crimean Tatars Since 2014,
thus Committing other Prohibited Acts
Finally, Russian perpetrators have persecuted Tatars since .
Russian authorities’ actions are of the same gravity as other crimes
against humanity because they deprived Tatars of basic human
rights. Like the victims in Blaški , the Russians inflicted serious
physical and mental harm on the Tatars, infringed on their freedoms,
and attacked their property. The Crimean Tatars enduring physical
and mental harm at the hands of Russians show violations to every
person’s right to physical and mental integrity. Russian authorities
. See Krnojelac, IT- - -T at (holding that perpetrators must intend to
obtain a certain result by torturing victims).
. HRC Report, supra note , , (stating that Russian authorities who
detained Crimean Tatars often used torture or ill-treatment to obtain specific
information or extract filmed confessions and to punish prisoners).
. Krnojelac, IT- - -T at .
. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN CRIMEA, supra note , (explaining
authorities used torture as a deterrence or investigative techni ue); Krnojelac, IT-
- -T at (describing ekovic being beaten to obtain information).
. See generally Prosecutor v. Bla ki , Case No. IT- - -A, Judgment in the
Appeals Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July , ).
. See HRC Report, supra note , , , , (listing violations of
fundamental human rights); Staki Appeals Judgment, IT- - -A, ; Blaški ,
IT- - -A at (describing acts that may be considered acts of
persecution).
. See HRC Report, supra note , (providing examples of torture and
unlawful detention); INTERNATIONAL CRIMES INCRIMEA, supra note ,
(discussing seizure of private property); Blaški , IT- - -A at
(describing acts that amount to acts of persecution).
. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN CRIMEA, supra note , at ,
(identifying cases of authorities physically abusing detainees and sub ecting them to
inhumane conditions); HRC Report, supra note , (reporting the abduction and
torture of a Tatar man).
. See generally HRC Report, supra note , (stating applicable human
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also targeted the Crimean Tatars’ private and public property.
Attacks against private property include defacing local businesses
and ousting Crimean Tatars from land where they had asserted
s uatters’ rights in the s. Beginning in , public memorials
which commemorated significant moments in Crimean Tatar history
have also been destroyed. Finally, Russia persecuted the Tatars by
committing the prohibited acts discussed in the foregoing analysis.
Because there is evidence of Russia intentional targeting of
individuals since they were ethnically Crimean Tatar, Russia satisfied
the discriminatory intent element of persecution. For example,
Police raids and Russian policies disproportionately targeted the
Crimean Tatars. Additionally, Russian authorities attacked
members of Crimean Tatar political groups and their family
members. Moreover, the Slavic and ethnic Russian’s treatment of
the Crimean Tatars since the eighteenth century shows a pattern of
marginalization and discrimination.
2. Because Russia Directed an Attack Against the Tatar Civilian
rights law prohibit torture and other cruel inhumane treatment ).
. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN CRIMEA, supra note , (discussing
documented attacks on property owned by Tatars). See generally Blaški , IT- - -
A at (stating the destruction of property may constitute a crime of
persecutions).
. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN CRIMEA, supra note , (stating that
Tatar shops have been attacked and defaced).
. See HRC Report, supra note , (discussing dismissal of s uatters
as ghosts or fake s uatters ).
. See INTERNATIONALCRIMES INCRIMEA, supra note , at nn.
(noting the destroying of monuments that were memorials to the Tatar deportation
and were of cultural significance to the Tatars).
. See discussion supra Part III.A. .a d (discussing four scenarios in which
Russia perpetrated crimes against humanity).
. Compare HRC Report, supra note , (stating that attacks
disproportionately targeted Tatars’ personal integrity and property), with Prosecutor
v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC- - , Judgment, (July , ) (holding
that attacks disproportionately targeted Lendu because of their ethnicity).
. HRC Report, supra note , .
. See, e.g., INTERNATIONALCRIMES INCRIMEA, supra note , at (reporting
that a Tatar activist was arrested with his three sons, one of whomwas less than three
years old).
. SeeWilliams, supra note , at (stating that Russian colonial rule in the
th century oppressed the Crimean Tatars).
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Population, It Committed Crimes Against Humanity
Russia directed an attack against the Tatars when it perpetrated
multiple prohibited acts against Tatar civilians. Each re uirement
for an attack, which Russia fulfilled, are discussed below.
a. Russia Directed an Attack Against the Tatars
First, there was an attack against the Crimean Tatars. Like many of
the cases cited above, the conflict in Crimea was military in nature
because Russia sent armed men in unmarked uniforms into Crimea.
However, Russia vehemently argues that the annexation of Crimea
was legal because of the referendum. Even if the international
community found that there was no armed conflict because the
annexation of Crimea was legal, there was ultimately still an attack
because of Russia’s mistreatment of the Crimean Tatars. Like
Kunarac, Russia mistreated Tatars when it perpetrated prohibited
. See generally Rome Statute, supra note , art. ( ) (stating that crimes
against humanity is the perpetration of prohibited acts as a part of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population ).
. See THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note , at (noting that the
Office’s analysis of the situation in Crimea depends largely on its own assessment
of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia); Prosecutor v. Tadi , Case No. IT- -
-T, Opinion and Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia May
, ) ( an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between
States ); Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note , art. (declaring that armed
conflicts includes all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a
Member State even if the said occupation meets no armed resistance. ).
. Charron, supra note , at .
. Id. at .
. But see G.A. Res. , supra note , (calling on all Members States
not to recognize the annexation of Crimea); Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note
, art. (indicating that armed conflict occurs in all cases of partial or total
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation
meets with no armed resistance. ).
. See generally Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT- - IT- - -A,
Judgment in the Appeals Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former
Yugoslavia June , ) (holding that an attack is not limited to armed conflict
and encompasses any mistreatment of the civilian population. ).
. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT- - -T, Judgment in the Trial
Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Feb. ,
)(finding an attack because the Serbs mistreated, imprisoned, and even killed
the Muslims in the regions at issue).
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acts.
b. The Tatars Constituted a Civilian Population
Second, because they were a part of a distinct ethnic group within
Crimea, the Crimean Tatars constituted a civilian population. The
Me lis members, who were categorized as extremists, were also
civilians. Alternatively, if some Tatars were extremists ust by
participating in a representative organization and protesting, their
presence in Crimea would not taint the other Tatars’ civilian status.
Too many other victims outside of the Me lis negate the attack against
a civilian population.
Russia’s actions reveal that its attack was directed against the
Tatars. There were patterns among forcible displacements, torture, and
arbitrary detention, which indicate that there were similar means and
method of the attack. Additionally, the disproportionate targeting
. See discussion supra Part III.A. (discussing the forcible transfer of the
Crimean Tatar population).
. See generally Prosecutor v. Tadi , Case No. IT- - -T, Opinion and
Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia May , ) (stating
that the civilian population must be predominantly civilian in nature ); Situation in
Kenya, ICC- , (stipulating that ethnic, national, or other distinct groups can
constitute a civilian population).
. See AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THE DARK, supra note , at (explaining
that the Me lis is an informal all-Crimean Tatar assembly . . . to represent the
community vis- -vis the local and central authorities and its members have been
sub ect to persecution by Russian de facto authorities).
. See Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of
Financing Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination (Ukr. v. Russ.), I.C.J. , Preliminary Ob ections
Submitted by the Russian Federation, , n. (Sept. ) (arguing that
Russian measures in detaining Tatars were valid because the Supreme Court of the
Republic of Crimea declared that the Me lis was an extremist organization).
. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR- - -T, Judgment in Chambre I,
(Sept. , ) (explaining that there still may be a civilian population when
certain individuals are actively participating in the hostilities).
. See, e.g., INTERNATIONALCRIMES INCRIMEA, supra note , , ,
(finding that at least , Tatars fled Crimea from - , that Russian de
facto authorities unlawfully detained Tatars, and that most victims of enforced
disappearances were Crimean Tatars).
. See id. , , (finding patterns such as Crimean Tatars
disappearing at the hands of de facto Russian authorities; documented forms of
torture including the use of electricity, firearm wounds, mutilation, severe
REPEATINGHISTORY
of Tatars demonstrates the discriminatory nature of the attack.
c. Russia had State Policy to Attack the Crimean Tatars
Third and finally, the allegations from Crimea show Russia’s policy
to attack the Tatars. Although Russia did not have a planned attack
from the outset, the evidence of a reoccurring pattern of violence
against the Tatars shows that a policy was crystalized over time. As
in Prosecutor v. Kupreški , Russia used its domestic police force as
resources to further the commission of prohibited acts, such as
arbitrary detentions, police raids, and physical and psychological
harm. Like Prosecutor v. Katanga, Russia’s policy was to target
the Tatars in order to gain more control over the Peninsula. This
policy became evident when Russia banned the Me lis, began
targeting its supporters and other Tatars, and began implementing
beatings, and strangulation for the purpose of punishment and extracting
confessions; and arbitrary detention). See generally Prosecutor v. Kordi , Case No.
IT- - -A, Judgment in the Appeals Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. For
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. , ) (examining the means and methods to
determine whether there was an attack against a civilians).
. See INTERNATIONALCRIMES INCRIMEA, supra note , , (finding
that a ma ority of victims of enforced disappearances and forced displacements were
Crimean Tatars). See generally Kordi , IT- - -A at (holding that the
discriminatory nature of the attack may show whether an attack was directed
against a civilian population).
. See Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC- - , Judgment pursuant
to article of the Statute, (Mar. , ) (explaining that, because a
formal policy is rare, a ma ority of cases involving crimes against humanity occur
when a State policy is crystalized over time through repetitive prohibited acts).
. Compare Prosecutor v. Kupre ki , Case No. IT- - -T, Judgement,
(Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Mar. , ) (finding that
the Military Police forcibly displacing the Muslim population through murder and
property destruction reached the level of a State policy), with HRC Report, supra
note , , (noting that police disproportionally targeted Crimean Tatars
through raids, arbitrary detention, and enforced disappearances).
. See Katanga, ICC- - at , (stating that there was a
policy to use a broader campaign of reprisals against the Hema ethnic group, pit
two ethnic groups against each other, and organize an attack against a village in
order to secure control over an area).
. See Application of International Convention for Suppression of Terrorism
and of International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Ukr. v. Russ.), I.C.J. , Application Instituting Proceedings,
(Jan. ) (noting the Russian goal to achieve ethnic dominance through
cultural erasure. ).
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actions that impeded on Tatar cultural affairs.
Russia’s actions also fit the ICC’s factors test for a State policy to
commit an attack. The number of Tatars that became victims at the
hands of de facto authorities fulfills the ICC’s scale factor. For
example, the number of Tatars that were forcibly displaced should
alone satisfy this factor. The allegations of each prohibited acts
satisfies the scale factor. The geopolitical background of the
attack against the Tatars also shows a State policy since the Tatar’s
history is one of continuous persecution and marginalization.
Finally, Russia’s inaction towards perpetrators is a failure to
act. It has not investigated the perpetrators yet, nor has it brought
any of the victims to ustice.
3. Because Russia’s Actions Constituted a “Widespread or
. SeeHRC Report, supra note , , , , ( Other victims include five
individuals with links to Crimean Tatar groups or institutions, including the
Me lis. . . . ).
. See OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note , at (listing ICC
factors for finding a state policy, which include the scale of violent acts, historical
and political background, and the mobilization of armed forces).
. Cf. id. at (arguing that the ICC scale factor was satisfied because of
increases of enforced disappearances, killings, and torture in Mexico during the
given time period).
. See INTERNATIONALCRIMES INCRIMEA, supra note , (documenting
figures from showing that , to , Tatars fled Crimea).
. See Situation in Kenya, ICC- , (stating that the scale of the
violence of the acts perpetrated includes murders and other acts of violence, rape,
arbitrary Imprisonment, deportations and expulsions or the destruction of non-
military property ).
. Vladimir Ryzhkov, “Russia’s Treatment of Crimean Tatars EchoesMistakes
Made by Soviets”, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. , AM),
https www.theguardian.com world nov -sp-russia-crimean-tatars-soviet-
ukraine.
. Cf. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note , at (explaining
that Mexico fulfilled the policy element through its failure to ade uately regulate the
use of force and its failure to investigate and prosecute the commission of atrocities).
. See AMNESTY INT’L, ONE YEAR ON, supra note , at (stating that
investigations into enforced disappearances remain open); HRC Report, supra note
, ( OHCHR findings confirm the continuing failure of the Russian Federation
authorities . . . to ade uately guarantee and protect a wide range of human rights in
Crimea. ).
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Systematic Attack”, There Were Crimes Against Humanity
The attack in Crimea was both widespread and systematic. First, the
reports and figures emerging show that the attack was widespread.
As in Blaški , the attack in Crimea was widespread because of the
number of victims. The fact that the Crimean Tatar population dropped
to since indicates that the prolonged attack resulted in a large
number of victims. Again, Russia forcibly displaced , to
, Crimean Tatars, forcibly disappeared at least seven
victims, and arbitrarily detained and tortured dozens more.
The attack was also widespread because it encompassed a large
geographic area. Specifically, it encompassed the Crimean
Peninsula. These facts are similar to those in Prosecutor v. Bemba,
where the Pre-trial Chamber found that there was a systematic attack
because of the widespread, consistent, and regular targeting in various
locations over the span of five months. Here, Russians have
. See generally Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT- - IT- - -A,
Judgment in the Appeals Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
June , ) (defining widespread as the large-scale nature of the attack and
number of victims ).
. See Prosecutor v. Bla ki , Case No. IT- - -T, Judgment, , (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. , ) (holding that a widespread
attack occurs with a large number of victims and that there were a high number of
victims in the case at hand).
. Application of International Convention for Suppression of Terrorism and of
International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Ukr. v. Russ.), I.C.J. , Application Instituting Proceedings, (Jan. ).
. INTERNATIONALCRIMES INCRIMEA, supra note , .
. See, e.g., HRC Report, supra note , (documenting that from March ,
to June , there were forty-two cases of enforced disappearances, nine
of whom were Crimean Tatar); INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN CRIMEA, supra note ,
(documenting seven enforced disappearances of Crimean Tatars from
until ).
. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN CRIMEA, supra note , (citing
cases of Crimean Tatars who were either unlawfully arrested or arbitrarily detained
from until ); CRIMEA SOS, SITUATION REPORT, supra note ( In ,
Crimea SOS recorded the largest number of criminal cases against Crimean Tatars
since the beginning of the occupation. ).
. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN CRIMEA, supra note , at (finding five
cases of torture against Crimea Tatars from to ).
. See HRC Report, supra note , , (finding serious human rights
violations throughout Crimea).
. Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC- - , Decision Pursuant to
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committed the crimes throughout the Crimean Peninsula since .
Thus, like in Blaški , there was a large-scale attack and a high number
of victims.
Evidence also demonstrates that the attack was systematic. Like
Akayesu, there was a regular pattern of abuse and criminal activity.
Patterns in Crimea included police disproportionately targeting
Crimean Tatars; authorities attacking Tatar businesses, monuments,
and mos ues; and the courts suppressing the Tatars’ political
voice. Most of these facts are eerily similar to those in Kunarac,
where the Trial Chamber found a systematic attack because the Serbs
removed Muslims from their social and professional lives, used
aggressive propaganda, attacked Muslim homes and property, and
assaulted and killed Muslims.
The attack was also systematic because it centered around a policy
to target the Tatars, which Russian institutions demonstrated through
their actions. For example, the Russian and Crimean Supreme
Courts’ decision to ban the Me lis for being an extremist
organization demonstrates the intent to target the group.
Article ( )(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, (June , )
. See INTERNATIONALCRIMES INCRIMEA, supra note , at (stating that the
International Partnership for Human Rights began collecting information about
perpetration of prohibited acts since September ).
. Prosecutor v. Bla ki , Case No. IT- - -A, Judgment in the Appeals
Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July , ).
. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR- - -T, Judgment in Chambre I,
(Sept. , ) (deciding whether the attack was thoroughly organized ;
followed a regular pattern ; had a common policy ; and involved substantial
public or private resources ).
. HRC Report, supra note , .
. INTERNATIONALCRIMES INCRIMEA, supra note , , .
. See, e.g., HRC Report, supra note , (reporting that Russia banned the
Me lis).
. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT- - -T, Judgment in the Trial
Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. , );
see also Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT- - IT- - -A, Judgment in
the Appeals Chamber, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June ,
) (affirming the Trial Chamber’s holding that the attack was systematic).
. Compare Akayesu, ICTR- - -T at (stating that there must be a
common policy involving private and public resources. ), with HRC Report, supra
note , (finding that de facto Russian courts, police, and other authorities
targeted Tatars).
. HRC Report, supra note , .
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Additionally, local police forces enforced the State policy when they
committed prohibited acts.
4. By Mistreating the Tatar Civilian Population in Allowing De
Facto Authorities to Perpetrate Prohibited Acts in Furtherance of
State Policy, Russia Committed Crimes Against Humanity
The situation in Crimea meets every re uirement for customary
law’s definition of crimes against humanity. Russia has perpetrated
prohibited acts since it allowed de facto authorities to forcibly transfer
the Crimean Tatar population, severely deprive Tatars of their liberty,
refuse to give information about Tatars who remain missing; torture
detained Tatars; and persecute the Tatar population. Next, Russia
directed an attack against the Crimean Tatars because Russia
mistreated the civilian Tatar population. In addition, Russia’s State
policy was evidenced in its reoccurring violence against the Tatars, its
mission to shut down the Tatars’ political voice, and its failure to stop
de facto authorities from committing prohibited acts. Finally,
Russia’s mistreatment of the Tatars was widespread and systematic
because of the continuous and related acts that resulted in many
victims and the use of official State actors to perpetrate the prohibited
acts. Therefore, Russia has committed crimes against humanity.
B. DEBUNKINGRUSSIA’SARGUMENT THAT ITS EFFORTS TO
COMBAT E TREMISMWAS LAWFULUNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Russia has argued ad nauseum that its actions against the Crimean
. See id. (noting in particular that police forces used coercive tactics). See
generally Situation in Burundi, ICC- - - -US-Exp, (finding that the State
was guilty of crimes against humanity when State police officers committed them).
. See discussion supra Part II.B. (discussing Crimes Against Humanity and
its definition under Customary International Law).
. See discussion supra Part III.A. (discussing crimes against humanity
perpetrated by Russia).
See discussion supra Part III.A. (analyzing the way in which Russia’s attack on
Tatar civilians constituted the commission of various crimes against humanity).
. See discussion supra Part III.A. (discussing the specific anti-Tatar policies
and violence against the civilian population).
. See discussion supra Part III.A. (discussing Russia’s use of a Widespread
or Systematic Attack and the ways in which this attack constituted a crime against
humanity).
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Tatars were legal under internal and international law because Russia
legally annexed Crimea after a referendum, and Russian authorities
had an obligation to detain extremists. Thus, its actions in detaining
the members of the Me lis and its supporters, detaining individuals
that it accused of being in the Hizb ut-Tahrir, violating their rights, and
restraining the media were all warranted actions.
However, the international community has refuted both of these
points multiple times. First, most international organizations and
States have opposed Russia’s annexation of Crimea as a violation of
international norms, particularly Article of the U.N. Charter.
Second, Russia’s ustification for targeting Me lis members and
other Tatars because they posed a threat to Crimeans’ safety is
incorrect. The core of Russia’s argument is that the Me lis is an
. William Englund, Kremlin Says Crimea is Now Officially Part of Russia
After Treaty Signing, Putin Speech, THE WASHINGTON POST (Mar. , ),
https www.washingtonpost.com world russias-putin-prepares-to-annex-
crimea b - e- ce- e- d c ffec story.html.
. Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing
Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination (Ukr. v. Russ.), I.C.J. , Preliminary Ob ections Submitted by
the Russian Federation, , n. (Sept. )
. AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THEDARK, supra note , at .
. See Preliminary Ob ections, I.C.J. at (holding that the
Crimean and Russian Supreme Court decisions did not address in substance the
issue of alleged violations of CERD by Russia against the Crimean Tatar
population).
. SeeG.A. Res. , supra note , (finding that the referendum
has no validity and calling on all States, international organizations, and specialized
not to recognize the legality of the annexation); U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc.
A PV. , supra note , at (noting that Member States voted in favor of
adopting draft resolution ).
. See, e.g., G.A. Res. , supra note , (finding that the
referendum has no validity and calling on all States, international organizations,
and specialized not to recognize the legality of the annexation); Will Dunham,
Kerry Condemns Russia’s ‘Incredible Act of Aggression’ in Ukraine, REUTERS
(Mar. , , AM), https www.reuters.com article us-ukraine-crisis-usa-
kerry kerry-condemns-russias-incredible-act-of-aggression-in-ukraine-
idUSBREA DG (reporting that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry
called the annexation of Crimea an act of aggression). See generally U.N. Charter
art. , (prohibiting acts of aggression).
. See Preliminary Ob ections, I.C.J. at n. (arguing that the
Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea banned the Me lis because its members
perpetrated acts of extremism).
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extremist organization. Thus, Russia argues that it has the authority
to exercise appropriate power to detain these individuals because it has
a duty under international law to fight extremism. However, the
Me lis leaders and other Crimean Tatars did not perpetrate any
criminal activity. According to Russian criminal law, extremism is
defined as the commission of violent acts that are meant to fright en
the population and creat e the threat of death of a person, significant
property damage or of other grave conse uences and are meant to
destabilize or influence the decision-making process of public
authorities, local self-government bodies, or international
organizations.
However, the Me lis leaders did not meet any of the criteria. It did
not commit any acts of violence towards people or property, and their
only action was to denounce Russia’s annexation of Crimea. There
is no evidence that the Crimean population felt threatened by the
Me lis. Additionally, a criti ue of a government does not rise to an
. See id. at n. (arguing that Russia’s actions in Crimea were valid
because the Me lis was a terrorist organization that perpetrated discriminatory
conduct ).
. See id. at (claiming that Russia detained certain Tatars for their
participation in extremism). See generally Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo
Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii O nekotorykh voprosakh sudebnoy praktiki po
ugolovnym delam o prestupleniyakh terroristicheskoy napravlennosti s
izmeneniyami, vnesennymi postanovleniyem plenuma ot noyabrya g. No.
fevralya g., Russian Federation Supreme Court Plenary Ruling on
Certain Issues of Judicial Practice in Criminal Cases regarding Terrorist Crimes as
amended by Plenary Ruling No. of November Feburary, ,
BIULLETEN’ VERKHOVNOGO SUDA RF BVS Bulletin of the Supreme Court of
the Russian Federation , No. , p. (Russ.) (listing the international
instruments that prohibit terrorism and explaining that the Russian Constitution
codifies the legal basis for countering terrorism).
. See AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THEDARK, supra note , at (referring to
the charges levied against the Me lis as trumped up ).
. UGOLOVNO-PROTESESSUAL’NYIKODEKSROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII UPKRF
Criminal Code art. (Russ.) hereinafter Russian Criminal Code .
. Mustafa Jemilev: It Is an Absurd to Decide Issue of Belonging of Any
Territory, Region or Settlement to Any State on “Referendum”, MEJLIS OF THE
CRIMEAN TATAR PEOPLE (Apr. , ), http tmm.org en news -mustafa-
emilev-it-is-an-absurd-to-decide-issue-of-belonging-of-any-territory-region-or-
settlement-to-any-state-on-referendum.
. See Gwendolyn Sasse, Terra Incognita – The Public Mood in Crimea,
ENTRUM F R OSTEUROPAUND INTERNATIONAL STUDIEN REP., no. , , at
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attempt to forcibly change a decision-making power. The
international community has since affirmed that the Me lis was not an
extremist organization.
Similarly, Russia has argued that Crimean Tatars were perpetrating
criminal activities by participating in protests before the
annexation and by oining Hizb ut-Tahrir. Firstly, Russia is not
allowed to prosecute protesters from before the annexation because it
violates the customary international norm of non-retroactivity.
Secondly, there was no substantial proof that the Hizb ut-Tahrir was
committing criminal activity in Crimea. NGOs’ reports fromCrimea
show that the accused were simply meeting in a mos ue. Thus,
under its own laws, Russia has no authority to claim that the Me lis,
the Hizb ut-Tahrir, and their supporters were extremists.
Third, even if Russia’s ends were legitimate, its means in
prohibiting criminal activity were not. Russia could have prosecuted
those it thought were extremists through legitimate means that
(finding that a ma ority of Crimeans believe that ethnic groups lives harmoniously
and that at least of Crimeans fully disapproved of banning the Me lis).
. See Russian Criminal Code, supra note , art. (stating that the Russian
government has the authority to punish those that commit violent acts and frighten
civilians to destabilize or influence the State).
. See, e.g., G.A. Res. , ( ) (Dec. , ) (urging Russia to revoke
its decision declaring the Me lis an extremist organization and to reinstate the
Me lis).
. See HRC Report, supra note , , (stating that Russia arrested
protesters and alleged Hizb ut-Tahrir members with little to no proof that the
individual was a threat to society).
. See ECHR, Guide on Article 7, supra note , ( The principle of non-
retroactivity is infringed in cases of retroactive application of legislative provisions
to offenses committed before those provisions came into force. ).
. See Crimean Tatars Face Unfounded Terrorism Charges, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (July , , AM),
https www.hrw.org news crimean-tatars-face-unfounded-terrorism-
charges (stating that Crimean men who were arrested in May were accused
of being members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a party that seeks the establishment of a
caliphate but does not espouse violence to achieve its goals. ); HRC Report, supra
note , (reporting that there was little evidence that the victims were connected
to extremist organizations).
. HRC Report, supra note , .
. Cf. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note , at (arguing that
Mexico’s policy to combat cartels was not legitimate because it resulted in crimes
against humanity).
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protected Tatars’ human rights and safety. Instead, it pursued path
that led to a widespread and systematic attack against the Tatar civilian
population, or in other words, that led to crimes against humanity.
Again, customary international law demands that under no
circumstances can crimes against humanity be perpetrated by an
individual or a State, which makes them absolutely non-derogable
by any action or treaty. There is no policy nor argument that Russia
can claim to ustify its actions against the Crimean Tatars.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. RUSSIANEEDS TO PROVIDERELIEF FOR THECRIMEAN TATARS
First and foremost, Russia needs to provide remedial measures for
the Crimean Tatars. Russia should interrogate the authorities who
committed prohibited acts and who directed them against the Crimean
Tatars. In doing so, it should find those responsible and prosecute
them. Russian authorities should also provide release to those in
being held in arbitrary detention and or bring those who are currently
held in prolonged pre-trial detention in front of a fair trial. It should
. See S.C. Res. , (b), (f) (Sept. , ) (calling on States to enforce
appropriate laws in order to incriminate terrorist activities while respecting their
human rights and ensuring that they have e ual access to the law).
. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the various Russian actions that
can should be classified as crimes against humanity that were taken against Crimean
civilians).
. See ILC Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity, supra note , pmbl.
( Recalling also that the prohibition of crimes against humanity is a peremptory
norm of general international law (jus cogens) and affirming that crimes against
humanity . . . must be prevented in conformity with international law ).
. See G.A. Res. , annex, supra note , art. (prohibiting the
recognition of actions that breach article as lawful).
. See generally AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THEDARK, supra note , at
(noting the NGO’s recommendations for rectifying the situation in Crimea). See
also HRC Report, supra note , (h) (re uiring states ensure effective
investigation of alleged violations of international law).
. See generally AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THE DARK, supra note , at
(recommending the prosecution of perpetrators of crimes against humanity). See
alsoHRC Report, supra note , (h) (re uiring that perpetrators of crimes against
humanity be held accountable for their actions).
. See generally AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THEDARK, supra note , at
(recommending the liberation of those individuals being arbitrarily sub ected to
legal proceedings for the exercise of the internationally recognized right to peaceful
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also disclose the whereabouts of persons who have disappeared.
Finally, it should provide all victims of torture and unlawful detention
with reparations.
Russia must implement the International Court of Justice’s order to
refrain from maintaining or imposing limitations on the ability of
the Crimean Tatar to conserve its representative institutions, including
the Mejlis. Thus, Russia must follow the mandate, reinstate the
Me lis, and reverse the Russian Supreme Court’s and Crimean
Supreme Court’s decisions which banned the Me lis for being an
extremist organization. It should also lift media restrictions in
Crimea.
Finally, Russia needs to give international organizations, non-
governmental organizations, U.N. human rights mechanisms, and
ournalists access the Crimean Peninsula. Only then can these
groups better assess the damage that de facto authorities have
inflicted. In particular, Russia should allow the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Special Monitoring
protest). See also HRC Report, supra note , (i) ( ) (re uiring the protection of
individuals peacefully voicing a non-discriminatory, non-violent opinion and the
protection of individuals from arbitrary searches).
. AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THEDARK, supra note , at .
. See G.A. Res. , annex, supra note , art. (stating that reparation can
include restitution, compensation and satisfaction ).
. Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukr. v. Russ.), I.C.J. , Provisional
Measures, (Apr. ).
. AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THE DARK, supra note , at ; HRC Report,
supra note , (r).
. AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THEDARK, supra note , at .
. See generally HRC Report, supra note , (explaining that the U.N.
General Assembly passed resolutions urging Russia to recognize human rights
monitoring mechanisms, as well as international and national human rights
organizations and that Russia declared that it was not bound by these resolutions);
Tanya Lokshina, Crimea Bans Journalists Are Choking the Truth, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Jan. , ), https www.hrw.org news crimea-bans-
ournalists-are-choking-truth (interviewing ournalist who was banned from Crimea
for covering human rights violations perpetrated against Tatars).
. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RIGHTS IN RETREAT ABUSES IN CRIMEA
( ) (urging that the United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe, and other bodies c ontinue to re uest documentation and public
reporting . . . on human rights conditions in Crimea ).
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Mission in Ukraine, OHCHR, and the Human Rights Monitoring
Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) into Crimea. Because these groups
had compiled the most information on Russia’s human rights
violations against the Crimean Tatars, they are best e uipped to
continue the work.
B. THE PROSECUTOR FOR THE INTERNATIONALCRIMINALCOURT
SHOULD START AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CRIMESAGAINST
HUMANITY PERPETRATED BY RUSSIA AGAINST THE TATARS
The ICC Prosecutor should hold Russia and individual perpetrators
accountable by beginning an investigation into the crimes against
humanity perpetrated against the Tatars. As previously mentioned, the
ICC has limited urisdiction over Crimea since Ukraine accepted
urisdiction relating to alleged crimes committed on its territory from
February onwards, with no end date and since the
Prosecutor announced the extension of the preliminary
examination . . . to include alleged crimes occurring after February
in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Currently, the Office of the
Prosecutor is still conducting its preliminary examination.
For the Prosecutor to begin an official investigation, she needs to
first complete the preliminary examination, which has multiple
re uirements. Specifically, she must decide whether the
information sent in a re uest is reliable; the Court would have
urisdiction; whether a case is admissible based on complementarity
. AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMEA IN THEDARK, supra note , at .
. See id. at (urging OSCE to continue monitoring human rights violations
in Crimea); HRC Report, supra note , (explaining that HRMMU provided a
ma ority of the information for OHCHR’s report on human rights violations in
Crimea).
. THEOFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note , at .
. Id.
. See BETH VAN SCHAACK RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAWAND ITS ENFORCEMENT CASES ANDMATERIALS ( d ed. ) (stating
that the preliminary examination has four phases and describing the re uirements
for each phase).
. See id. at (explaining that during Phase the Prosecutor will filter out
matters that are outside the Court’s urisdiction, are already sub ect to an
investigation, or need further information).
. See Rome Statute, supra note , arts. (re uiring temporal,
national territorial, and sub ect matter urisdiction for cases that are not Security
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and gravity; and whether a trial would serve the interest of ustice.
If the Prosecutor decides to begin an investigation, she may re uest
the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue arrest warrants or a summons to
appear for committing crimes against humanity.
In this situation, there is enough information to warrant an
investigation into Russia’s actions against the Crimean Tatars. The
Prosecutor has already declared that the Court has urisdiction over the
Peninsula, thus fulfilling the first two re uirements. Moreover, the
case is admissible because Russia would be unwilling to prosecute
individuals since Russia has yet to investigate disappearances,
instances of torture, or other violent acts committed against the
Tatars. The case has enough evidence to be grave enough to fulfill
the definition of crimes against humanity. Finally, holding
individual perpetrators accountable and investigating the fate of Tatar
victims would provide ustice for the victims and their families.
Since there is enough evidence to meet all of the re uirements of an
investigation, the Prosecutor should uickly conclude the preliminary
investigation before Ukraine revokes its limited urisdiction. Doing
Council refers); see alsoVANNSCHAACK SLYE, supra note , at (stating
that t he Prosecutor must believe that there is a rational basis for temporal,
national territorial, and sub ect matter urisdiction to exist ).
. Rome Statute, supra note , art. ; see alsoVANNSCHAACK SLYE, supra
note , at , (defining complementarity as the ability and willingness of a
State to investigate or prosecute perpetrators and gravity as the scale, nature, and
manner of commission of the crimes ).
. Rome Statute, supra note , art. ( )(c); see alsoVANNSCHAACK SLYE,
supra note , at (explaining that the Prosecutor will determine whether an
investigation will serve the interests of ustice based on the gravity of the crimes,
number of victims, and other concerns).
. Rome Statute, supra note , art. .
. THEOFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note , at .
. See AMNESTY INT’L, ONE YEAR ON, supra note , at (stating that
investigations into enforced disappearances remain open); HRC Report, supra note
, ( OHCHR findings confirm the continuing failure of the Russian Federation
authorities . . . to ade uately guarantee and protect a wide range of human rights in
Crimea. ).
. See discussion supra Part III (analyzing the crimes against humanity
perpetrated by Russia against the Crimean Tatars).
. See Crimea: Enforced Disappearances, supra note (reporting that Tatar
victim’s family was still waiting for information about his whereabouts).
. Cf. THEOFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note , at (reporting that the
Philippines withdrew from the Rome Statute in which severely limited the
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so would allow the Prosecutor to arrest and interrogate individual
perpetrators, thus providing ustice to the victims.
C. THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITYNEEDS TOHOLDRUSSIA
RESPONSIBLE FOR PERPETRATING INTERNATIONALLYWRONGFUL
ACTSAGAINST THE TATARS
Finally, the U.N. should send a peace-keeping mission to Crimea to
hold Russia accountable for these targeted crimes. Russia has ignored
every recommendation from international organizations and human
rights bodies. The Security Council, which is typically the organ that
typically punishes States for committing crimes against humanity,
would not be able to pass a resolution over a Russian veto. Instead,
the U.N. General Assembly can pass a resolution for a peace-keeping
mission if the Security Council fails to act. Because Russia has not
acted, the U.N. General Assembly should send a peace-keeping
mission to investigate, observe, and maintain premises over Crimea.
States are also obligated to stop violations of peremptory norms.
Thus, they should act outside of international institutions. For
example, they could continue to impose economic sanctions on
temporal urisdiction of the preliminary investigation).
. Rome Statute, supra note , art. .
. See HRC Report, supra note , (citing specific circumstances when
Russia has been called upon to remedy its behavior and the continuing state of being
in which no rectifying actions have been taken).
. See Sean D. Murphy (Int’l Law Comm’n Special Rapporteur for Crimes
Against Humanity), Third Report on crimes against humanity, , U.N. Doc.
A CN. ( ) (defining the U.N. Security Council’s function).
. See UN: Russia and China’s Abusive Use of Veto “shameful”, supra note
(citing instances of Russia vetoing resolutions that did not suit its interests).
. See G.A. Res. (V)(A), (Nov. , ) (establishing a peace-
keeping mission when the Security Council failed to).
. See THOMAS G. WEISS ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS AND CHANGING
WORLD POLITICS ( th ed. ) (listing functions of U.N. peace-keeping
mission).
. See G.A. Res. , annex, supra note , art. ( ) (States shall cooperate
to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach . . . ).
. See Draft articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful
acts, in Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
U.N. GAOR Supp. No. , U.N. Doc. A ( ), reprinted in Y.B.
Int’l L. Comm’n , U.N. Doc. A CN. SER.A Add. (Part ) (stating that
States can act outside of institutions to hold other States responsible).
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Russia. However, it would be more helpful if States sent
international organizations funds so that they could continue to
conduct research in the Crimea. States could also send aid to the
Tatars that remain in Crimea.
V. CONCLUSION
The actions of Russian authorities in Crimea, which includes
arbitrarily detaining Crimean Tatars, torturing them, forcibly
displacing them, denying their whereabouts when they disappeared,
depriving them of their homes, and attacking their private and public
property, constitute crimes against humanity under customary
international law. Russia therefore oversaw the commission of
prohibited acts that were part of a widespread and systematic attack
against a civilian population that was pursuant to State policy. Russia
needs to immediately grant the Crimean Tatars remedial provisions.
Additionally, the ICC Prosecutor should begin an investigation in
Crimea for crimes against humanity committed against the Tatars.
Finally, if Russia fails to implement these remedies, as it has done
since , then the U.N. Security Council should not hesitate to send
a peace-keeping mission under its Chapter VI powers.
. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN CRIMEA, supra note , (reporting that
countries put economic sanctions on Russia after the annexation of Crimea).
. See, e.g., OHCHR’s Funding and Budget, OHCHR (last visited Sept. ,
), https ohchr.org EN AboutUs Pages FundingBudget.aspx (reporting that
OHCHR relies heavily on State contributions).
. See, e.g., Natalie inets, Turkey Offers $50 million Loan to Ukraine, Urges
Protection of Crimean Tatars, REUTERS (Mar. , , AM),
https www.reuters.com article us-turkey-ukraine turkey-offers- -million-loan-
to-ukraine-urges-protection-of-crimean-tatars-idUSKBN MG V
(reporting that the Prime Minister of Turkey offered to Ukraine that they could
use to protect the Crimean Tatars).
